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ARTICLES
The Two-Thirds Verdict: A Surviving
Anachronism in an Age of Court-Martial
Evolution
HOWARD C. COHEN*
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970's, the United States Supreme Court has
heard a progression of cases concerning state statutes which, in
contradiction to long-standing history and tradition, have permit-
ted criminal conviction either by juries consisting of less than
twelve jurors or without the necessity of a unanimous verdict.
The Court has held that in regard to the individual states, neither
a twelve person jury nor a unanimous verdict is constitutionally
mandated.' Eventually, however, the Court concluded that a state
criminal jury hearing a non petty offense must number at least six
persons, and if this minimum is employed, then unanimity is con-
stitutionally required.2
In contrast to the civilian community, all military prosecutions
with offenses for which death is not mandated, require only a two-
thirds majority to convict, regardless of the number of members
sitting upon a court-martial.3 As well, non petty offenses can be
heard by a general court-martial numbering as few as five mem-
bers.4 The question is whether these differences between civilian
and military requirements are constitutionally valid.
Although sixth amendment jury protections are not applicable
to military courts-martial, the military courts are subject to fifth
amendment due process, including the standard of reasonable
doubt.5 Therefore, founded upon principles of due process, mili-
* Lieutenant Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Naval Re-
serve; Adjunct Professor, University of San Diego; B.A., Princeton University, 1965;
J.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1972; currently in private practice in San
Diego, California.
1. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
2. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223
(1978).
3. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (1982).
4. 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1982).
5. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); United States v. Ezell, 6
M.J. 307, 313 (C.M.A. 1979).
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tary defendants have attacked the numerical composition and re-
quired verdict ratios of military courts-martial based on the
differences between the courts-martial and civilian juries.
These attacks have been unsuccessful to date since the military
appellate courts have attempted to distinguish between juries and
courts-marital, based upon the presumed difference in their re-
spective qualitative composition and functions. 6 When such dis-
tinctions are examined analytically in light of the evolution of
military justice, the reasoning of the military courts appears to be
seriously flawed. This Article demonstrates that a deficiency ex-
ists in distinctions between juries and courts-martial thus failing to
justify any difference in the numerical vote necessary to convict
an accused of a non petty offense.
I. SUPREME COURT CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS IN CIVILIAN
COURT: REASONABLE DOUBT, JURY SIZE, AND
VERDICT REQUIREMENTS
In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled upon two companion cases
concerning the conviction of individuals by less than unanimous
verdicts involving twelve person juries.7 In Apodaca v. Oregon,8
five justices concluded that the defendant's conviction upon a ten
to two verdict did not violate an individual's sixth amendment 9
right to a trial by jury in a state case.' 0
In Johnson v. Louisiana," the defendant, who had been con-
victed by a nine to three vote in a state trial, was procedurally
foreclosed from pursuing a sixth amendment claim.' 2 Instead, his
argument was premised upon fourteenth amendment equal pro-
6. See, e.g., United States v. Guilford, 8 M.J. 598 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United
States v. Wolff, 5 M.J. 923 (N.C.M.R. 1978).
7. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972).
8. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
9. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
.... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
10. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406. The five justice vote consisted of a four-justice
plurality-plus Justice Powell's concurrence common to both Johnson and Apodaca.
Justice Powell's concurrence, read together with the four dissenters, leaves little doubt
that in federal civilian criminal jury trials a unanimous verdict is constitutionally re-
quired. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 371 (Powell, J., concurring in both Johnson and
Apodaca).
11. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
12. Although the Court had held in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
that the sixth amendment was generally applicable to the states by the terms of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, it subsequently held that Duncan
was only prospective in application. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
[Vol. 20
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tection and fifth amendment due process grounds.13 In particular,
Johnson's due process argument was that in order to give sub-
stance to the constitutionally required reasonable doubt standard,
as established two years earlier,' 4 due process must be construed
to require a unanimous verdict. 15 While the Court held that the
votes of three jurors for acquittal could not be said to impeach the
verdict of the other nine (i.e., unanimity is not required) in the
same breath the Court implied that a "substantial," or a "heavy"
majority of the jury must remain convinced of the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the reasonable
doubt harbored by particular individual jurors may coalesce into
a reasonable doubt of the jury as a whole when a sufficient
number, albeit a minority, vote for acquittal. But this only holds
so long as those who vote for guilt do not constitute a substantial
majority.
Related to the issue of unanimity was the question of jury size.
In 1970, the Supreme Court examined, in Williams v. Florida,'7
the purposes which gave rise to the development of the institution
of the jury. The Court concluded that by "historical accident,"
twelve person juries had come into existence.' 8 Those previous
cases which had assumed the number twelve to be constitutionally
mandated were cast aside by the Court since none had considered
the history and function of the jury.19 Though the wisdom of Wil-
liams has come under criticism,20 such critical analysis is beyond
the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that the ultimate conclu-
sion of Williams was that a state jury of six was not unconstitu-
tional. The Court, however, expressly reserved ruling on whether
any number less than six would pass constitutional muster.2'
The constitutionality of less than six member juries was met in
Ballew v. Georgia,22 a case involving a unanimous five-person
state verdict. Specifically, the Court faced a two-fold question:
13. "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. The Court in, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) wrote: "Lest there remain
any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we ex-
plicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction ex-
cept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364.
15. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 359.
16. Id. at 362.
17. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
18. Id. at 89-90.
19. Id. at 90-92.
20. See collected cases in Sperlich,.. . And Then There Were Six: The Decline of
The American Jury, 63 JUDICATURE 262, 265 n.14 (Dec.-Jan. 1980).
21. Williams, 399 U.S. at 91 n.28.
22. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
1983]
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(1) whether a jury of less than six inhibited its functioning to a
significant degree, and if so, then (2) whether any countervailing
state interest justified such disruption of the jury's functioning.23
The Ballew decision held that the sixth amendment, as applied to
the state, required a minimum of six jurors in a civilian criminal
trial. 24
In reaching its holding, the Court cited various concerns. First,
the empirical data compiled by scholarly research spawned by
Williams during the intervening eight years, suggested that pro-
gressively smaller juries were less likely to foster effective group
deliberation.2 5 The Court stated:
At some point, this decline [in the number of people in a group]
leads to inaccurate fact-finding and incorrect application of the
common sense of the community to the facts. Generally, a pos-
itive correlation exists between group size and the quality of
both group performance and group productivity.26
Various explanations have been offered to support such a conclu-
sion.27 The smaller a deliberative group, the less likely it is that
members will make critical contributions. Also, because of the
fallibility of the human memory, a decrease in the size of the
group leaves fewer members to remember important aspects of
evidence or argument. Additionally, the smaller a group the less
likely it is to succeed in overcoming the biases of its individual
members.
A second concern of the Ballew court was that the empirical
data raised doubts concerning the accuracy of the result achieved
by smaller and smaller panels.28 The statistical studies relied
upon by the Court demonstrated that the risk of convicting an
innocent person (Type I error) significantly rose as the size of thejury decreased,29 while the larger the jury, the greater is the risk of
acquitting a guilty individual (Type II error). The Court neverthe-
less mandated a jury with a minimum of six members. 30
A third doubt about smaller juries stemmed from the increasing
inconsistency amongst results of smaller and smaller juries.3' In
other words, the propensity of twelve-person juries to deviate
from the average propensity to convict was far less significant
23. Id. at 231.
24. Id. at 245.
25. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232 (1978).
26. Id. at 232-33.
27. Id. at 233.
28. Id. at 234.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
[Vol. 20
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than the variation amongst six-person juries.32
Once the Court concluded that a reduction in the number of
jurors below six substantially threatened constitutional guaran-
tees, the Court considered whether any interest of the state justi-
fied such a reduction. The only alleged justification was the
claimed savings in court time and financial costs. 33 The Court
concluded that the asserted saving in judicial time was not proven,
and that while financial benefits of a reduction from twelve to six
were substantial, a further reduction from six to five would be
minimal.34 Therefore, no significant state interests exised to jus-
tify threatening the constitutional guarantees of the accused.35
Ballew was followed a year later by Burch v. Louisiana.36 In
Burch, the defendant had been convicted of a non petty offense
37
by a five to one vote. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded
that such a vote was adequate since the court in Williams v. Flor-
ida had found a six-person jury permissible and since a five-sixths
vote was a greater percentage concurrence than the three-fourths,
nine to three, verdict upheld in Johnson v. Louisiana.38 While the
percentage in Burch was greater than that in Johnson, it was obvi-
ous the number of votes to convict in Johnson (six) exceeded that
in Burch (four).39
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Louisiana
state court. The Court recognized that the Burch case was at the
very "intersection of our decision concerning jury size and una-
nimity."'4 But having departed, in Williams v. Florida, from
strictly historical treatment of jury trial, the Court found that it
32. Id. at 235.
33. Id. at 243-44.
34. Id. at 244.
35. Id.
36. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
37. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the plurality opinion concluded
that "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury where
imprisonment for more than six months is authorized." Id. at 69. See also Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 n.6 (1979).
In the military context, only a general court-martial has the potential jurisdiction to
impose imprisonment in excess of six months. Pending legislation before Congress
would, inter alia, create a commission to study certain revisions in military law in-
cluding increasing the sentencing jurisdiction of a special court-martial to one year.
S. 974, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(b)(1)(c) (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. 974]. See, how-
ever, Appendix B.
38. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
39. Implicit in the conclusion of the Louisiana Supreme Court was the assump-
tion that the concurrence of the same percentage in groups of different size will be
achieved with equal difficulty. In other words, it will be just as difficult to achieve a
five to one vote as a ten to two vote, and it will be more difficult to muster that same
five to one vote than a nine to three vote. That assumption is not necessarily true.
See infra note 65.
40. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979).
1983]
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had become inevitable that a line had to be drawn somewhere if
the substance of ajury trial was to be preserved.41 The Court con-
cluded, for many of the same reasons that led it in Ballew to de-
cide that the use of a five-person jury threatened both the proper
role of the trier-of-fact and the fairness of the proceeding, a con-
viction by only five votes out of six similarly threatened the sub-
stance of a jury trial.42 For this reason, a six-person jury must
return a unanimous verdict for guilt. But the Court stated: "We,
of course intimate no view as to the constitutionality of non-unan-
imous verdicts rendered by juries comprised of more than six
members." 43
In military courts-martial an accused can be convicted of a non
petty offense by a court-martial with as few as five members and
only two-thirds finding guilt. Military defense counsel therefore,
have pursued a Ballew-Burch attack against the court-martial size
and verdict ratio employed in military justice. Before proceeding
to review the treatment by the military appellate courts of the con-
stitutional issues related above, it is appropriate to briefly describe
the court-martial system.44
II. COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURES
Under its constitutional power "[t]o make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces," 45 Congress en-
acted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.). 46 The
U.C.M.J. provides, inter alia, for the creation of military courts-
martial,47 including pretrial, trial, sentencing, and review proce-
dures, 48 as well as specifying military offenses (the punitive
articles).49
The military services are perforce dependent upon maintaining
discipline. Under the policy of the President as authorized by the
Congress, 50 commanding officers are expected to maintain disci-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 138.
43. Id. at 138 n.l1.
44. The author presumes that the reader attracted to this subject will have some
degree of knowledge concerning courts-martial. Nevertheless, a brief recap of mili-
tary law is provided for the uninitiated. For a similar but more extensive treatment,
see, Comment, The Military Justice System and the Right to Trial by Jury. Size and
Voting Requirements of the General Courts-Martialfor Service Connected Civilian Of-
fenses, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 617, 624-32 (1981).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
46. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982).
47. 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-29 (1982).
48. 10 U.S.C. §§ 830-76a (1982).
49. 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1982).
50. Congress has authorized the President to prescribe pretrial, trial, and post-
trial procedures. 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1982). Pursuant to this authorization, the current
[Vol. 20
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pline through effective leadership and, when necessary, through
nonpunitive measures. 51 Should a member of the service exhibit
behavior requiring punishment, a commanding officer, without
resort to court-martial, can impose certain limited nonjudicial
punishment which is "primarily corrective in nature. '52
If the commanding officer concludes that his nonjudicial pun-
ishment authority is inappropriate or insufficient, he may desire to
refer the transgressor to a court-martial. There are three types of
courts-martial: summary, special, and general.5 3 The choice of
court should be the "lowest court that has the power to adjudge an
appropriate and adequate punishment. 54
A summary court-martial, a one officer court, does not differ
remarkably in its punishment authority from what a senior com-
manding officer may impose as nonjudicial punishment.55 In con-
trast, special and general courts-martial may impose punishments
far in excess of what a commanding officer may impose. The
punishment jurisdiction of a general court-martial is limited to the
maximum for those offenses of which the accused stands con-
victed. The punishment jurisdiction of a special court-martial is
limited to either (a) six months imprisonment 56 or (b) the maxi-
mum for the convicted offenses imposed by the Table of Maxi-
mum Punishments, whichever is less. 57
Civilian criminal juries tend to be of a uniform size, for exam-
ple, twelve or six. In contrast, the numerical composition of spe-
cial and general courts-martial varies considerably. The
minimum number of members is five for a general court-martial
Manual for Courts-Martial was promulgated in 1969 [hereinafter cited as MC.M,
1969] by President Nixon as Executive Order 11476. Each of the succeeding Presi-
dents has promulgated at least one amending executive order. Currently, a complete
revision of a new Manualfor Courts-Martial is nearing completion; the most impor-
tant changes, however, do not affect the issues of court-martial member numbers or
composition or verdict quorums. See, e.g., Courts-Martial Manual Getting Major
Overhaul, Navy Times, June 20, 1983, at 12, 44.
51. MC.M., 1969, supra note 50, at 129a.
52. Id. at 129b.
53. 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-20 (1982).
54. MC.M, 1969, supra note 50, at 33(h).
55. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 815(b)(2)(H) (1982) with 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1982). As the
term "nonjudicial punishment" implies, a decision of "guilt" and imposition of pun-
ishment by a commanding officer is not a judicial determination; however, a finding
of guilty by a summary court-martial ir a judicial determination.
56. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1982). In addition to its confinement jurisdiction, a special
court-martial may also adjudge a limited forfeiture of pay, reduction in rank, and
when permitted by the Table of Maximum Punishments, a bad conduct discharge.
See infra note 57.
57. The Congress has authorized the President to prescribe maximum limitations
on punishments for the particular offenses. 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1982). Pursuant to that
authority, a Table of Maximum Punishments has been promulgated. M. CM., 1969,
supra note 50, at 127c.
1983]
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and three for a special court-martial. 58 Regardless of the number
of members of a court-martial, the concurrence of members neces-
sary to convict is a minimum of two-thirds.59 Where the death
penalty is mandatory,60 only a unanimous verdict may convict. 61
To sentence a person to death, where death is not mandated, like-
wise requires a unanimous vote of the members.62 To sentence a
person to life imprisonment or confinement for more than ten
years requires a concurrence of three-fourths, whereas all other
sentences require a concurrence of two-thirds.63
Though an offense tried by a special court-martial could argua-
bly be said to be non petty,64 this Article shall limit its discussion
to a determination of the constitutionality of the statutory scheme
by which a general court-martial consisting of as few as five65 per-
58. 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1982).
59. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (1982).
60. Conviction for spying in wartime requires the death penalty. I0 U.S.C. § 906
(1982).
61. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1) (1982).
62. 10 U.S.C. § 852(b)(1) (1982). In October, 1983, in United States v. Matthews,
16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983), the Court of Military Appeals held that the capital sen-
tencing procedure did not pass constitutional muster. The court, in essence ruled that
within ninety days if either Congress amended the U.C.M.J., or the President
amended the Manualfor Courts-Martial, a new constitutionally valid procedure could
be promulgated. The accused could then face resentencing before a new court-
martial.
63. 10 U.S.C. § 852(b)(2)(3) (1982).
64. As previously discussed, see supra note 56, the special court-martial jurisdic-
tion extends to reducing an enlisted individual in rate (as far as to the lowest pay
grade, E-1) as well as adjudging a bad conduct discharge. While indirect conse-
quences of civilian incarceration may include jeopardizing a job or career and the
stigma associated with a conviction, should a special court-martial reduce an individ-
ual in grade the devastation to the accused's career is more than conjectural. Addi-
tionally, the opprobrium of a punitive discharge from the service is far more severe
than whatever stigma may result from a misdemeanor conviction.
65. With five being the minimum quorum and there being no specific maximum,
the quotient necessary for conviction varies in relation to the number of members
eventually voting. Thus, a "numbers game" occurs. Hence, all other factors held
constant, given a choice between five and six person courts, the defense would prefer
the former while the government would desire the latter. Since four votes are re-
quired to convict in either case, a six person court gives the government the luxury of
affording an additional but superfluous vote for acquittal.
In contrast with not only five person courts, but also with seven and eight person
courts, a six person court is preferable to the government. For one reason, the addi-
tional one or two members must both vote for guilt to ensure a conviction. For a
second, the larger the deliberative group, the more likely dissent may exist.
One commentator on military law has addressed the "numbers game" in detail.
See Smallridge, The Military Jury Selection Reform Movement, 19 A.F.L. REV. 343
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Smallridge]. Major Smallridge provides a table of the
percentages necessary to convict as a function of total members. Id. at 376. An impli-
cation of the table may be that for six, nine, twelve, and fifteen member courts, the
percentages being identical, there would be comparable likelihoods of conviction or
acquittal.
Whether Major Smallridge intended such an implication, the United States
Supreme Court has made an explicit statement of such sentiment. Williams v. Flor-
9
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sons can convict by a concurrence of two-thirds. In other words,
is a military accused effectively denied his fifth amendment due
process right to the standard of reasonable doubt when the delib-
erative body is small and the concurrence needed for conviction is
a mere two-thirds?
Seemingly, this combination of too small a group and lack of
unanimity is violative of the United States Supreme Court's opin-
ions in Ballew and Burch which held respectively that non petty
offenses must be tried by a minimum of six persons and if such
minimum is used, the verdict must be unanimous. Nevertheless,
those Courts of Military Review which have specifically discussed
the issues of court-martial size, or vote necessary for conviction in
regard to Ballew or Burch, have held those cases inapplicable to
the military setting.66 An analysis of those cases follows.
ida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 n.49 (1970). However, the opposite conclusion may be true. See
M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURTS 78 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as SAKS & HASTIE].
Major Smallridge also concludes that "obviously" a five person court-martial, re-
quiring the highest percentage of consensus, is the most advantageous to the defense.
Smallridge, supra note 65, at 376. This is debatable since the conclusion does not take
into account the differences in behavior between large and small groups. In other
words, consensus-be it four out of five or even five out of five-may be more easily
achieved in a small group than a lesser percentage in a large group, for example, nine
out of twelve.
66. The appellate process entails Courts of Military Review and a Court of Mili-
tary Appeals. Each service department has its own Court of Military Review com-
posed of commissioned officers and/or civilians. The functions of these courts, unlike
a civilian appellate court, include not only determinations of law but also weighing
evidence, judging the credibility of witnesses, and determining controverted questions
of fact. 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1982). The Court of Military Appeals shall review the record
in all cases; (1) in which the sentence as affirmed by a Court of Military Review
affects a general or flag officer or extends to death, (2) reviewed by a Court of Mili-
tary Review which had been reviewed under order of the respective Judge Advocate
General, and (3) in which, after review by a Court of Military Review and upon
petition by an accused and good cause, the Court of Military Appeals grants a review.
The court may take action only with respect to matters of law. 10 U.S.C. § 867. See,
however, Appendix B.
Those recent cases of the Courts of Military Review relevant hereto include:
United States v. Montgomery, 5 M.J. 832 (A.C.M.R. 1978); United States v. Wolff, 5
M.J. 923 (N.C.M.R. 1978); United States v. Meckler, 6 M.J. 779 (A.C.M.R. 1978);
United States v. Con, 6 M.J. 914 (N.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Guilford, 8 M.J.
598 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Yoakum, 8 M.J. 763 (A.C.M.R. 1980), summ.
affirmed, 9 M.J. 417 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Seivers, 9 M.J. 612 (A.C.M.R.
1980), summ. affirmed, 9 M.J. 397 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Gaines, No. 80
0413 (N.M.C.M.R., November 30, 1982).
The Court of Military Appeals has not yet chosen to grant petition to the issue. In
United States v. Lamela, 6 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1970), the court originally granted review
but then vacated the grant, 6 M.J. 32 (C.M.A. 1978). More recently, Chief Judge
Everett has implied that the Ballew-Burch argument is inapplicable to courts-martial.
United States v. Brown, Army C.M.R. No. 15417, affirmed, 13 M.J. 381 (C.M.A.
1982). Most recently, in two capital cases, United States v. Rojas, 15 M.J. 902
(N.M.C.M.R. 1983), mandatory review filed, 15 M.J. 453 (C.M.A. 1983) and United
States v. Hutchinson, 15 M.J. 1056 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983), mandatory review filed, 16
10
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III. MILITARY APPELLATE COURT RULINGS UPON COURT-
MARTIAL COMPOSITION, SIZE, AND VERDICT RULES
The first relevant published court case of military review fol-
lowing Ballew was United States v. Montgomery.67 Montgomery
was tried and convicted before an Army general court-martial
consisting of five members. Relying upon Ballew, he appealed
contending that his conviction of a non petty offense by a court-
martial numbering less than six was unconstitutional. The Army
Court of Military Review rejected his Ballew argument on the
ground that since the military judicial system is exempt from the
provisions of the sixth amendment, Ballew was inapplicable. 68 No
argument was made, nor did the court discuss matters beyond the
numerical composition of the trial court-martial. 69
Subsequently, in United States v. Meckler,70 another Army case,
the accused contended he had been denied due process in a con-
viction by a general court-martial numbering five members. The
Army Court of Military Review, without elaborating upon what
type of due process the accused had allegedly been denied, re-
jected his appeal by simply citing Montgomery.71
At the same time the Army Court of Military Review was con-
sidering the ramifications of Ballew, the Navy Court of Military
Review did likewise in United States v. Woff. 7 2 The appellant did
not assert the sixth amendment, but rather argued that "the quali-
ty of justice provided by group deliberation decreases as the size
of the group is reduced to the point that the product delivered by
groups of less than six, is unacceptably poor," and hence violative
of the fifth amendment due process.73 The Navy court disagreed:
We find no evidence in the record to support this premise when
the rationale is applied to courts-martial, and we are unwilling
to adopt and apply the empirical data referred to in Ballew.
That data was compiled in the civilian community, from juries
randomly selected to represent a cross-section of the civilian
community. Courts-martial are not selected in that manner.
M.J. 110 (C.M.A. 1983), the appellants have again raised a Ballew argument. In
Rojas, the Court of Military Review with no independent analysis declared the prece-
dent "most persuasive". 15 M.J. at 919. The Hutchinson court merely referred to
Rojas and the cases cited therein. 15 M.J. at 1063-64.
The most important of the above cases are discussed in detail below.
67. 5 M.J. 832 (A.C.M.R. 1978).
68. Id. at 834.
69. The court did conclude that the variability of the number of members on
different courts-martial was a discrimination not so unjustifiable as to be violative of
fifth amendment due process. Id.
70. 6 M.J. 779, 780 (A.C.M.R. 1978).
71. Id.
72. 5 M.J. 923 (N.C.M.R. 1978).
73. Id. at 924.
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Rather, they are deliberately chosen on the basis of who is best
qualified to sit as a court member.74
The court's reasoning is faulty on several grounds. First, by re-
quiring a showing by the appellant that a five-member court-mar-
tial does not render the same quality justice as does a larger
court,75 it failed to apply a most important principle, namely, that
the "burden of showing that military conditions require a differ-
ent rule than that prevailing in the civilian community is upon the
party arguing for a different rule."'76
Second, even if as a matter of law the burden was not already
on the government, it would be unfair to place such a burden of
persuasion on the defendant. If one infers that the Wolff court
was insisting upon evidence related to military courts-martial
rather than civilian or mock juries, a herculean, if not impossible
task would be placed on the defense. Whereas in the civilian com-
munity, psychological studies may be conducted upon civilian
mock juries, the military does not lend itself to psychological stud-
ies of mock courts-martial. Similarly, in the civilian context, ac-
tual jurors may be polled in court and interviewed post-trial. In
stark contrast, the deliberation and tally of court-martial mem-
bership is secret and inviolate, with no provision for polling the
members or conducting post-trial interviews or analysis.7 7 The
defense, is effectively foreclosed from attaining the data required
to make the showing demanded by the Woff court.
Third, the court's conclusion that the defendant received the
due process which Congress contemplated, does not necessarily
follow logically from the court's premises. In this regard, the court
relied upon DeWar v. Hunter.78 In DeWar, which predates the
enactment of the U.C.M.J., the tenth circuit dealt with the issue of
whether an enlisted person should have been entitled to enlisted
personnel on the court-martial board which had condemned him
to death.79 The DeWar court concluded that the defendant was
74. Id. at 925.
75. Id.
76. Courtney v. Williams, 1 M.J. 267, 270 (C.M.A. 1976). Surprisingly, however,
the Wolff court cited and relied upon Courtney in a different context. Woff, 5 M.J. at
925.
77. The oath for court-members is prescribed by M. .M., 1969, supra note 50, at
114(b); it provides inter alia: "you will not disclose or discover the vote or opinion
of any particular member of the court. . . upon the findings or sentence unless re-
quired to do so in due course of law." Id. Indeed, while the court may recommend
clemency to the convening authority, nevertheless, such recommendation cannot be
based upon a doubt as to the guilt of the accused for such impression "divulges the
vote or opinion of any member making such a recommendation and thereby violates
his oath." Id. at 77(a).
78. 170 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1948).
79. Id. at 994.
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not so entitled, ruling further that the sixth amendment was not
applicable to military courts. 80 But the court departed from that
basic conclusion in dictum, which under present law is subject to
serious doubt. The court said:
A soldier is subject to military law and what constitutes due
process in a trial by a military tribunal is gauged by the princi-
ples of military law enacted by the Congress, provided the ac-
cused is given due notice of the charge against him, a fair
opportunity to prepare his defense, and his guilt is adjudicated
by a competent tribunal.81
As discussed above, present law prescribes that in matters of
due process, the rule applicable in civilian courts is applicable in
the military courts unless the party seeking a different rule carries
the burden to demonstrate the necessity of a distinction.8 2 This is
but a corollary of the principle enunciated originally by the
United States Supreme Court in Burns v. Wilson 83 and interpreted
by the Court of Military Appeal, that service personnel are pro-
tected by the entire Bill of Rights unless those protections are ex-
pressly or impliedly made inapplicable. 84 Whether DeWar has
been mooted by Burns and its progeny, it should nevertheless not
be questioned whether the due process contemplated by Congress
for military justice, Le., the due process preferred in DeWar, did
include the full scope of the protection to be afforded an accused
by the standard of reasonable doubt.8 5
Finally, and most importantly, the summary rejection by the
Woff court of the Supreme Court's reliance upon social psycho-
logical studies is questionable. The rationale for such rejection is
that the studies were conducted in a civilian context and hence
were inappropriate to the military courts.
The court's unwillingness to adopt and apply the empirical data
referred to in Ballew fails to recognize that while much of the data
cited in Ballew did originate from the study of randomly selected
civilian juries, the essence of Ballew lies in the recognition of the
principles of human group dynamics. An analysis of the human
dynamics of small fact-finding deliberative groups, therefore, is
pertinent to determine whether a significant difference exists be-
tween the civilian context and the military context.
Such analysis may begin by highlighting the similarities regard-
80. Id. at 997.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
84. United States v. Ezell, 6 M.J. 307, 313 (C.M.A. 1979).
85. Reasonable doubt is constitutionally required under the fifth amendment, see
supra note 14 and accompanying text, and is statutorily required. 10 U.S.C.
§ 851(c)(2) (1982).
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ing the criteria for selection of court members. The criteria em-
ployed by the military pursuant to Article 25 of the U.C.M.J.
includes: age, education, training, length of service, experience,
and judicial temperament.86 The first five criteria are obviously
redundant in application. That is, the older the member's age, the
more likely the member has endured a longer length of service,
gained more training, experience, and education.87 The last crite-
rion-judicial temperament-may or may not be related to the
former five.
In regard to the criterion of judicial temperament, it cannot be
successfully argued that the inclusion of such a qualifying factor
in Article 25 makes the military court distinguishable from civil-
ian courts. Under California law, for example, the qualified jury
list drawn from the master jury list requires a selection of only
those persons who, inter alia, "are of a fair character and ap-
proved integrity, and who are of sound judgment,"88 that is, those
who exhibit judicial temperament. Indeed, the Court of Military
Appeals has recognized that all civilian jurisdictions have qualifi-
cations for jurors similar to judicial temperament. 89 Judicial tem-
perament is, therefore, not a significant factor to distinguish the
composition of a court-martial from that of a jury.
Not surprisingly, the most important factors contributing to the
determination of a fact-finding group such as a jury or court-mar-
tial is the presentation of the case and the relative convincing
weight of the evidence.90 Nevertheless, in those cases where rea-
sonable minds may differ, what demographic criteria, if any, con-
tribute to the quality or bias of any particular individual?
A myriad of social and psychological studies abound. 91 Suffice
it to say for the purposes of this Article, there exists a lack of con-
sistent relationship between demographic variables and group be-
havior. This is due to the many unique factors associated with a
criminal case. There is little reason to believe that individual
characteristics offer any aid in predicting group behavior such as
86. 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1982).
87. During the legislative debate prior to the enactment of the U.C.M.J., Con-
gress was apparently aware of such redundancy. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford,
35 C.M.R. 3, 12, 19 (C.M.A. 1964).
88. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 205 (West 1982).
89. United States v. Crawford, 35 C.M.R. 3, 8 (C.M.A. 1964) (emphasis added).
90. See, e.g., SAKS & HASTIE, supra note 65, at 98.
91. In addition to the studies specifically referred to within this Article, as a rep-
resentative but not all inclusive bibliography, see id. at 223-41; H. KELLEY & J. THI-
BAUT, Group Problem Solving, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 88-100
(G. Lindzey & E. Aronson eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as KELLEY & THIBAUT, 1969];
H. KELLEY & J. THIBAUT, Experimental Studies of Group Problem Solving and Pro-
cess, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 781-85 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson
eds. 1954) [hereinafter cited as KELLEY & THIBAUT, 1954].
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jury or court-martial deliberations. 92
In particular, studies which have examined the potential corre-
lation between age, income, education, occupational status, and
legal experience and a juror's verdict have demonstrated no sig-
nificant correlation. 93 As far as such criteria are concerned, one
may presume that a judge is "better" qualified than the averagejuror; yet this presumption may be doubted. Although judges andjuries usually agree on the issue of guilt, nevertheless, in approxi-
mately twenty percent of the cases94 there is disagreement. In
such cases, one jurist has commented that upon reflection, he real-
ized that the jury's decision had been the correct one rather than
his, and ascribed the jury's more accurate determination to the
size of the jury, the cultural and social composition of the jury,
and a requirement that substantially more than a majority of the
members must reach agreement.95
While these sociological/psychological results cast serious
doubt upon the Woff court's conclusion concerning the minimum
number of court members, other psychological observations may
cast doubt upon the military courts' less than unanimous require-
ment. A discussion of such observations will be examined follow-
ing the analysis of the treatment of Burch v. Louisiana by the
military courts.
Since Burch, requiring that if the minimal six person jury is uti-
lized then a guilty verdict must be unanimous, one military court,
has attempted to analyze and distinguish the reasoning of Burch
in the military context. 96 In United States v. Guiford,97 ten of-
ficers were initially detailed to the court-martial; three of them,
however, were excused from attending the trial, and of the seven
remaining, none were challenged, either peremptorily or for
cause.
With concurrence of only two-thirds necessary for conviction,
the minimum vote necessary to convict was five. Since the record
did not indicate whether five, six, or seven had voted to convict,
the Guiford court, while upholding the verdict, presumed for the
92. J. DAVIS, R. BRAY & R. HOLT, The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in
Juries: A Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES (J. Tapp & F. Levine, eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
DECISION PROCESSES].
93. See R. BUCKHOUT, A JURY WITHOUT PEERS 13 (1973); Sealy & Cornish,
Jurors and Their Verdicts, 36 MOD. L. REV. 496 (1973); S. PENROD, R. HASTIE & N.
PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY ch. 7 (1983).
94. SAKS & HASTIE, supra note 65, at 98.
95. C. Joiner, From the Bench, in JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 146-47 (R. Simon,
ed. 1975).
96. United States v. Guilford, 8 M.J. 598 (A.C.M.R. 1979).
97. Id.
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benefit of the accused that the vote had been five to two.98 In
concluding that Burch was not controlling, the Guilford court re-
lied on three grounds: (1) arithmetic, (2) the inapplicability of ci-
vilian jury data, and (3) the differences in the functions of a jury
and a court-martial. Each of these will be examined in turn.
A. Arithmetic (or the Numbers Game)
Initially, the Guilford court concluded that Burch did not "gov-
ern" on the basis of a reservation in Burch that the Court was
"intimating no view as to the constitutionality of nonunanimous
verdicts rendered by juries comprised of more than six mem-
bers." 99 Reliance upon such an intimation without regard for the
policies underlying the Burch holding is an example of being
overly literal.l1 ° While the seven person court-martial in Gui/ford
does exceed the six person jury addressed in Burch, the principles
of Burch should indeed govern and give guidance to the issue con-
fronted in Gui/ford.
Although civilian criminal juries are generally uniform in the
number of jurors employed, for example six or twelve, courts-
martial are variable depending upon the number of officers origi-
nally convened and the number who may be excused at any time
during the trial. Any particular general court-martial could
number, therefore, from five to twelve or more. Thus, just as
there may be a sliding number of members, arguably there should
be a sliding scale of votes necessary to convict.
In Johnson v. Louisiana,101 on the basis that a "substantial' ma-
jority existed whereby three votes for acquittal failed to impeach a
nine vote majority, the Supreme Court found a nine to three vote
for conviction permissible. 0 2 Perhaps, due to the lack of expres-
sion in Burch v. Louisiana of where a line may be drawn, the
Court may eventually address an eight to four verdict and uphold
its validity, concluding that it represents a heavy and substantial
98. Id. at 601 n.3. As noted above, whether or not more than five members actu-
ally concurred in the verdict is unascertainable; see supra note 77 and accompanying
text.99. Guilford, 8 M.J. at 601, citing Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 n.11
(1979).
100. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 91 n.28 (1970), when the Court ruled that
state six-person juries were constitutionally permissible, the Court reserved ruling on
any lesser number by stating: "We have no occasion in this case to determine what
minimum number can still constitute a 'jury', but we do not doubt that six is above
that minimum." Following Williams, Georgia instituted five-member juries. In Bal-
lew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 230-31 n.9 (1978), the state argued that "If six is above
the minimum, five cannot be below the minimum. There is no number in between."
The court characterized that argument as "absolute literalness." d.
101. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
102. Id. at 362.
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majority. A seven to five verdict, however, is unlikely to survive
constitutional attack.10 3
If straight line graphs are drawn linking 6/6 and 9/12 in one
instance, and 6/6 and 8/12 in a second, (graphs A and B are re-
spectively produced)l0 both graphs indicate that a seven personjury or court-martial should require seven to convict rather than
six, and in both cases, the threshold where a dissenting acquittal
vote would not impeach the remaining guilty votes appears to
emerge with a group of eight. Should a group of seven be held to
constitute a sufficiently large group where a dissent would be held
not to impeach the remaining guilty votes, such tolerable dissent
103. Since a six to six tie represents no majority on a twelve person jury, the mini-
mum majority would be a seven to five vote. It would be incongruous to term a
minimum majority as a heavy and substantial majority.
104.
TABLE A TABLE B
12 12
II II
10 10
9 9
7 7
0 6 6
> 5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
MEMBERS
Table A is mathematically defined as y = (x/2) + 3, 6 _< x _< 12, and Table B is
described as y = (x/3) + 4, 6 !< x_ 12. Since the number of votes necessary to convict
requires that when a fraction results, such fraction will be counted as one, that is,
raised to the next highest whole, MCM, 1969, supra note 48, at I 74(d)(3), the convic-
tion ratios permitted by Table A are 6/6, 7/7, 7/8, 8/9, 8/10, 9/11, and 9/12, and
Table B, 6/6, 7/7, 7/8, 7/9, 8/10, 8/11, and 8/12.
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should seemingly be held to one, ie., a six to one vote, rather than
two, ie., the five to two vote sustained in Gui/ford.
The Guilford court, however, wisely did not rely upon arithme-
tic as its sole reason to ignore Burch. One of the two remaining
rationales was the asserted inapplicability of civilian jury data.
B. Civilian Jury Data
In regard to civilian jury data, the Guiford opinion curiously
states without citation or reference that:
[D]ata indicating that jurors supposed to represent a cross-sec-
tion of a local civilian community do not adequately perform
their function under certain conditions cannot be taken to
mean that the purpose and function of courts-martial are simi-
larly impaired.10 5
Taken in context with its citation to United States v. Woff and
other various military decisions which held Ballew inapplicable,
the inference one may draw is that Guilford was adopting the rea-
soning of Wolff by rejecting so-called civilian studies. 0 6 Since
Burch rests "squarely" upon Ballew, Guilford reasons, Burch must
similarly be rejected. 0 7
This conclusion is countered by two rejoinders. First, as dis-
cussed above, 08 the logic of Woff is seriously flawed, and there-
fore, to the extent that Guiford rests upon WoffJs reasoning, it too
is flawed. Second, even if one is to assume, arguendo, that the
criteria of U.C.M.J. article 25(d)(2) serves to distinguish courts-
martial from the studies upon which Ballew and Burch are postu-
lated, psychological principles dictate that because of those very
criteria a court-martial should have a more stringent majority rule
than the present two-thirds.
A court-martial, like a jury, is in fact a small decisionmaking
group subject to the same psychological phenomena as are other
small decisionmaking groups.'°9 The first task a small decision-
making group must accomplish is to organize and produce leader-
ship.110 The longer this takes or the more competitive the process
of choice, the less organized the group may remain and the more
likely that conflicting subgroup coalitions may form." ' I The faster
105. United States v. Guilford 8 M.J. 598, 601 (A.C.M.R. 1979).
106. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
107. Guilford, 8 M.J. at 601-02.
108. See supra notes 86-95 and accompaying text.
109. See SAKS & HASTIE, supra note 65, at 66.
110. See KELLEY & THIBAUT, 1954, supra note 91, at 761; KELLEY & THIBAUT,
1969, supra note 91, at 31, 71-72, 76.
111. Id.
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and the less competitive the initial organization is, the more cohe-
sive the group is likely to be.
While a jury and court-martial may be subject to the same psy-
chological phenomena, because of the differences in their demo-
graphic composition, the resultant pressures associated with
decisionmaking may differ. While a jury is seated at random and
must first choose its foreperson, the court-martial is at its incep-
tion organized on the basis of seniority.' 1 2 The court-martial thus
begins its existence as a cohesive group, and such cohesion tends
to pressure its members toward conformity and unanimity."13
While members of a jury chosen at random tend to be heteroge-
nous in character, the members of a court-martial tend to be ho-
mogenous. The tendency shall be to have a court consisting of
officers, 11 4 and as such, college educated,"15 male, 116 white, 17 and
of course, from the same profession. Again, as with organization
and leadership, the more homogenous a group the less differences
in opinion shall exist with a correspondingly greater pressure to-
ward uniformity and conformity." 18
112. The senior officer remaining after challenges is the presiding officer.
M. .M., 1969, supra note 50, at 40(a). He/she has special powers and duties, akin
to, but exceeding that of a foreperson of a jury. Id. at 40(b). Even the seating
arrangement of the court-martial members is specified according to rank, similar to
the seating of appellate judges. Id. at 6 1(b).
113. See KELLEY & THIBAUT, 1954, supra note 91, at 761; KELLEY & THIBAUT,
1969, supra note 91, at 71-72; L. BERKOWITZ, Sharing Leadersho in Small, Decision-
making Groups, in SMALL GROUPS: STUDIES IN SOCIAL INTERACTION 547, 554 (A.P.
Hare, E. Borgatta & R. Bales, eds. 1962).
114. Although an enlisted accused may demand a court-martial consisting of not
less than one-third enlisted personnel, 10 U.S.C. § 825(c)(1) (1982), the assumption
amongst military attorneys is that an enlisted accused of the lower ranks will not
make such an election for fear that the enlisted personnel chosen by the convening
authority shall be from the senior enlisted ranks who shall be more severe than com-
missioned officers. See Letters to the Editors, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, March 1983, at
69. Little empirical data is available to test the thesis.
115. The estimated percentage of total Department of Defense commissioned of-
ficers who had graduated from college as of September 30, 1980 was 95.3 percent.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR 1980.
Table 2-5, at 68 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MANPOWER STATISTICS].
116. Male officers constitute approximately ninety-two percent of total officers.
Id. Compare MANPOWER STATISTICS id., Table 2-13, at 99 with Table 2-19, at 113.
117. The percentage of white officers in all services as of June 30, 1972 was 97.2
percent. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES, Vol. II, at 55 (1973) [herein-
after cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
118. See Festinger & Thibaut Interpersonal Communication in Small Groups, 46 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 92-99 (1951), a study conducted under contract with
the Office of Naval Research; KELLEY & THIBAUT, 1954, supra note 91, at 761.
Additionally, it may be noted that, by chance alone, larger groups will tend to be
more heterogenous than small ones. I. STEINER, GROUP PROCESS AND PRODUCTIV-
Try 129 (1972). Thus, a small group, say five or six, will tend to be more homogenous
than a group of twelve. While individual members of small groups, all other matters
being equal, will be more unique than those of a larger group, in the courts-martial
[Vol. 20
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Additionally, one must consider the impact of what may be
termed the authoritarian personality. 119 Individuals of high au-
thoritarian personality who perceive themselves dissimilar to the
defendant will tend toward a guilty verdict; conversely, high
authoritarians who perceive similarities between themselves and
the accused tend toward acquittal. In the military context, the
only similarity between the defendant and the members of court-
martial may be the service to which they belong. The differences,
however, may be striking since the members of the court-martial
will predominantly be college educated, white officers, while the
defendant is typically an enlisted individual, of lesser educa-
tion, 120 who may often be of a racial or ethnic minority.' 21 There-
fore, to the extent that members of a court-martial tend to have
authoritarian personalities and perceive themselves as dissimilar
to the accused, a preexisting pressure toward a guilty verdict may
exist.
Because the sixth amendment is inapplicable to the military
trial, random selection resulting in a heterogenous group of triers
of fact is not constitutionally required.122 To the degree that a
homogenous tribunal consisting primarily of male, white, college-
educated officers creates conforming pressures, an attendant de-
crease in the deliberative process will result. While increased
pleasantness and minimized disagreement may be desirable in
many group contexts, the collective trier of fact is a particular
group where disagreement and contentiousness are precisely what
should be stimulated to test more severely the compelling weight
of evidence.123 Where such stimulation is lacking because of the
homogenous character of the deliberative group, the "substantial"
majority required in Johnson v. Louisiana necessitates a greater
need of unanimity in guilty verdicts. This is especially true in
groups as small as six and but little dissent for an acquittal in
groups only slightly larger.
In addition to the asserted inapplicability of civilian jury studies
and the mathematical argument addressed above, the Gui/ford
context all other matters are not equal but rather the general characteristics of mem-
bers tends toward homogeneity.
119. See generally, DECISION PROCESSES, supra note 92, at 335.
120. See MANPOWER STATISTICS, supra note 115, at 68.
121. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 117, Vol. I, at 31. A racial difference
does not imply overt racism. It can, however, result in misunderstanding. If an ac-
cused minority takes the stand, his ability to communicate to the court-martial may
spell the difference between guilt and acquittal. The task force concluded that "man-
ners of speech in non-standard English. . . can be construed as manifestations of
dullness or disrespect by those not familiar with the speech pattern in question." Id.,
Vol. II at 43.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Kemp, 46 C.M.R. 152, 155-56 (C.M.A. 1973).
123. See SAKS & HASTIE, supra note 65, at 81.
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court also chose to focus upon the differences in function between
a jury and a court-martial to distinguish the holdings of Ballew
and Burch. Whether the asserted "differences" are different or
relevant is open to serious doubt.
C. Functions of a Court-Martial
One asserted difference between a jury and a court-martial is
the determination of sentence. 124 While it is true that currently a
court-martial determines the accused's sentence while juries do
not, 25 this distinction is not logically relevant to the threshold is-
sue of the appropriate decisionmaking rule for conviction. The
fact that the court-martial may eventually be posed with a sen-
tence determination after conviction has no impact upon the ap-
propriate majority that should be necessary for conviction.126
Also, in regard to sentencing by a court-martial, another practical
124. United States v. Guilford 8 M.J. 598, 602 (A.C.M.R. 1979).
125. Juries, of course, are tasked with the responsibility of deliberating upon the
most important sentences of all, te., death. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.3,
190.4 (West Supp. 1983).
126. In capital cases where death is not mandated, although the sentence of death
must be unanimous, the guilty verdict presently need only be the two-thirds vote.
Two such cases are currently pending before the Court of Military Appeals. See
supra note 66. The fact that a death sentence must be unanimous can m no wayjustify a two-thirds verdict. No matter that a member may have voted for acquittal,
regardless of such vote, it is his duty to vote for a proper sentence for the offense for
which the accused stands convicted. M.C.M, 1969, supra note 50, at 76(b)(2). This
compulsion of military law is not new; a noted nineteenth century military legal ex-
pert wrote:
At the first impression it might seem unreasonable and inconsistent that a
member, fully persuaded that the accused was innocent, or at least that the
evidence had failed to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt, and who had
voted accordingly, in the minority, for an acquittal, should at the next mo-
ment be required to adjudge that a specific punishment be imposed upon
him as upon a guilty person. But this apparent inconsistency disappears
when the principle is recalled, which has heretofore been set forth as result-
ing from the fundamental rule of the government of the majority in court-
martial proceedings; viz. that the finding, when completed, becomes the act
and judgment of the court as a unit, the opinions of the majority and minor-
ity no longer existing as such but being absorbed in the conclusion of the
whole. Where, therefore, the accused has been found guilty, the conviction
is to be recognized and acted upon by each member as a fixed fact-as
something which has passed out of the region of individual opinion and
become ascertained and concluded. Though he may have voted not guilty,
he is to vote upon the sentence precisely as if he had voted for a conviction,
or as if the fact of guilt had been determined by some competent agency
wholly independently of himself, and the rightfulness of such determination
was beyond question.
Further, he must not only vote a sentence but-when the punishment is
discretionary-an adequate sentence, i.e., one commensurate to the offence
or offences found. If, having voted to acquit, he gives his vote for a slight
and inadequate penalty, he fails in his full duty as an officer and member of
the court.
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consideration arises. The possibility exists, as it is presently being
contemplated in Congress, that the power to sentence may be re-
moved from the members and placed solely upon the military
judge presiding at the trial. 127
The other functional "difference" referred to by the Gui/ford
court is the ability of the members of a court-martial to pose ques-
tions. 28 No express statutory authority grants the court-martial
members that privilege. Rather, the U.C.M.J. delegates to the
President the power to prescribe trial procedure regulations con-
sistent with the trial procedures of the federal district courts. 129
Under such delegation, the President in the Manual for Courts-
Martial has granted the members of courts-martial the right to
pose questions. 130
In contrast to the mere existence of such a privilege, the extent
of its use or the quality of the questions posed would be of greater
importance in a determination of whether a different decision-
making rule should be employed by a particular trier of fact. In
other words, granted that the members of a court-martial may
pose questions, if the questions actually posed do not assist them
in their duty, then logically no different decisionmaking rule
should be utilized. The evidence available affords no confidence
that members of courts-martial effectively employ questioning. 131
WINTHROP, W., MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 392 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
WINTHROP].
In addition, those who voted to acquit on the state of the evidence during the guilt
phase of trial may find that evidence, otherwise inadmissible during the guilt phase,
but admissible during the penalty phase, for example, in aggravation, would compel a
vote for death. That a court-martial would have little difficulty in assessing death in a
case where matters of aggravation may warrant the same does not denigrate against
the principle that the standard of reasonable doubt may not have met with a two-
thirds verdict on guilt. It does not follow and this Article does not urge that because a
greater majority than is now required should be imposed for conviction, that a two-
thirds vote is improper for sentencing in most cases. Whereas the individual member
need only deliberate in regard to conviction on a dichotomous question, ie., whether
the government has proven each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, in
sentencing, any number of variables may be put in issue. Sentencing is not merely a
determination of time in custody. Rather, it encompasses more: Is a punitive dis-
charge appropriate and if so, what type?; Is a reduction in rank appropriate and if so,
how much?; Is time in custody appropriate and if so, how long?; Is afine appropriate,
and if so, how much? Because of the wide variety of possibilities, a consensus of two-
thirds may remain altogether appropriate whereas the dichotonomous issue of guilt
should require a larger consensus, at least for courts-martial numbering no more than
twelve members.
127. See S. 974, supra note 37, at § 9(b)(1)(A). See, however, Appendix B.
128. United States v. Guilford, 8 M.J. 598, 602 (A.C.M.R. 1979).
129. 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1982).
130. M.C.M., 1969, supra note 50, at I 54(b). One may query whether the execu-
tive direction to permit questioning by the court members is consistent with the trial
procedures in the district courts.
131. See Appendix A.
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Additionally, this alleged difference cannot support the distinction
between courts-martial and juries since a multitude of civilian ju-
risdictions either encourage or permit jurors to pose questions. 32
The Guilford court failed to demonstrate that courts-martial
and juries do not differ significantly in their functions in relation
to reaching a verdict. More importantly, it failed to perceive that
courts-martial have, in their functioning, evolved in the recent
past to resemble their civilian counter-part. An analysis of mili-
tary legal history clearly demonstrates such an evolution.
IV. A HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE COURTS-
MARTIAL
Although codifications of English military law predated the
American Revolution, 133 it is convenient to begin to trace the
evolution of the court-martial from that time. During the revolu-
tion, the British Army was governed by the Articles of War of
1765. Section XV, articles I and II required that a general court-
martial should not consist of less than thirteen commissioned of-
ficers.134 Although no article addressed the necessary quorum for
conviction of a noncapital offense, a sentence of death by a gen-
eral court-martial required a minimum of nine votes and if the
number of members exceeded thirteen, a judgment required a
concurrence of two-thirds. 135
Following the outbreak of the war, the Second Continental
Congress enacted the American Articles of War of 1775. In large
part these were substantial replications of the British Articles.' 36
One notable exception was the absence of a specific provision con-
cerning the vote necessary to impose death. Then, in 1776, the
Articles were enlarged and modified, and the required two-thirds
concurrence for capital punishment was re-introduced. 37
The first significant amendment occurred in 1786. Because
there were circumstances where offenders could escape punish-
ment while serving with small detachments having less than thir-
132. See collected cases in.Propriety of Jurors Asking Questions in Open Court Dur-
ing Course of a Trial, Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3d 872, 878-79 n.15 (1970).
133. British and other European military law had been codified for many centu-
ries previous. See, e.g., WINTHROP supra note 126, at 17-20, 903-946.
134. Articles of War, 1765, sec. XV, arts. I and II.
135. Id at sec. XV, art. VIII.
136. Smallridge, supra note 65, at 344. Major Smallridge asserts the only differ-
ence between the two codes was that the British required field grade officers or above
at general courts-martial whereas the American Articles did not. Id. A comparison
of the two codes does not reveal such a distinction. The comparable provisions both
placed the restriction of field grade rank upon only the President. Compare Articles of
War, 1765, sec. XV, art. I, with Articles of War, 1775, art. XXXIII.
137. Articles of War, 1776, sec. XIV, art. 5.
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teen officers, the articles were revised to establish that a general
courts-martial could consist of any number of commissioned of-
ficers from five to thirteen inclusively. The general courts-mar-
tial, however, were not to consist of less than thirteen "where that
number (could) convene without manifest injury to the
service."138
Despite the firm mandate of the latter phrase requiring thirteen,
the United States Supreme Court subsequently held that the
phrase "manifest injury," was "merely directory to the officer ap-
pointing the court, and that his decision as to the number which
can be convened without manifest injury to the service, being in a
matter submitted to his discretion, [was] conclusive."' 39
Military courts-martial composition remained comparatively
static for approximately 134 years with only minor amend-
ments. 14° Similarly, the functioning of the court-martial remained
relatively unchanged. In regard to its functions, Colonel William
Winthrop 141 provided this description:
Thus it has frequently been compared, as to some of its powers
and proceedings, to ajudge, and as to others to ajury. Indeed,
in its taking of a statutory oath, its being subject to challenge,
its hearings and weighing of evidence, its finding of guilt or
innocence, and its liability to be reassembled to reconsider its
verdict, it nearly resembles a traverse jury in a criminal court.
On the other hand, in its arraignment of the accused, its enter-
taining of special pleas to its jurisdiction or competency as a
court and objections to the sufficiency of the pleadings and the
admission of testimony, its authority to grant continuances and
to adjourn, and its power to impose sentence, it is more closely
assimilated to the judge.' 42
Indeed, in early English codifications the members of a court-
martial were respectively referred to as the judges, 143 and it was
138. Articles of War, 1786, art. 1.
139. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 35 (12 Wheat. 1827).
140. See WINTHROP, supra note 126, at 23, 976-85, 986-96. The 1916 legislation
was H.R. 17498, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). The Articles of 1806 and 1874 are re-
printed in WINTHROP, supra note 126, at 976-96. Several minor modifications oc-
curred in the interim years. Id. at 23-24, 997-1000.
141. Colonel Winthrop was described during the hearings before the subcommit-
tee of the Committee of Military Affairs as:
[Tihe Blackstone of the Army, a man of great capacity to express himself,
and who was also a keen legal reasoner. But Col. Winthrop was first a mili-
tary man, and he accepted easily and advocated the view that courts-martial
are not courts, but are simply the right hand of a military commander.
Establishment of Military Justice: Hearings on S, 64 Before the Subcomm. of the
Comm on Military Affairs United States Senate, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1919)
(Statement of Gen. Ansell) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, 1919].
142. WINTHROP, supra note 126, at 54-55 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
143. The Articles of War of James II, 1688, art. XLVIII provided in part:
1983]
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precisely because of their role as judges and the similarity of the
court-martial to other English courts, such as the King's Bench,
Common Pleas, and Court Exchequer, that the then majority rule
for conviction existed rather than the unanimity required of the
English jury.144
The administration of military justice came under severe criti-
cism in the latter part of the First World War and culminated in
substantial revision in 1920.145 The legislation, which began as
Senate Bill 64,146 had been authored by the former Acting Judge
Advocate General of the Army, Samuel Ansell,147 and was intro-
duced by Senator George Chamberlain.1 48
While much of the controversy centered on a meaningful re-
view of courts-martial sentences by a higher authority, the new
articles did serve to change the character of the courts-martial in
several particulars: the minimum quorum was reduced to five
without the necessity of a showing of manifest injury,149 the vote
ratio necessary to convict for non-capital offenses was increased
from a majority to two-thirds, 150 qualifications for service as
members were added,' 5' and a law member was added to the
Such who are Judges in a General Court-Martial or in a Regimental Court-
Martial, shall hold the same Rank in those Courts as they do in the Army
for Orders sake,. . .; and shall demean themselves orderly in the hearing of
Causes, and before giving of Sentence every Judge shall deliver his Vote or
Opinion distinctly ....
Id. Similarly a noted nineteenth century British military law commentator also re-
ferred to court-martial members as judges. C. CLODE, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
UNDER MILITARY AND MARTIAL LAW 127-29 (1874). See also infra note 163.
144. 2 J. MCARTHUR, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF NAVAL AND MILITARY
COURTS MARTIAL 170 (3d ed. 1806).
145. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759, repealedby Act of May 5, 1950, ch.
169, 64 Stat. 107, amended by Act of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 632, 82 Stat. 1335
[hereinafter cited as Act of 1920]. See Appendix B.
146. The new Articles of War as enacted were part of H.R. 12775. The original
version of H.R. 12775 had been amended by striking out its entirety and substituting
what had been S. 3792. The original H.R. 12775 and S. 3792 had been parallel efforts
in the respective houses of Congress to reorganize the Army. Efforts to engraft new
Articles of War upon the original H.R. 12775 failed in the House of Representatives.
The efforts in the Senate succeeded, however. The new Articles had been proposed as
S. 64. Eventually, however, S. 64 was added as an amendment to S. 3792. Thereafter,
S. 3792 (and subsequently, H.R. 12775 as enacted) contained two parts: I, Army Re-
organization and II, Articles of War.
147. See S. 64, 66th Cong. 1st Sess. (1919). The hearings in part became a vehicle
for an acrimonious debate between General Ansell and the Judge Advocate General,
General Enoch H. Crowder. See Smallridge, supra note 65, at 346-47.
148. While Senator Chamberlain did, in fact, introduce the legislation, he was not
in complete agreement with all of General Anselrs suggestions. See generally, Hear-
ings, 1919, supra note 141.
149. Act of 1920, supra note 145, ch. II, art. 5.
150. Id. at ch. II., art. 43.
151. Id. at ch. II, art. 4.
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court.' 52 While the bill that emerged from the subcommittee after
hearings did differ in certain respects from Ansell's draft, no writ-
ten report or document exists clearly delineating the legislators'
reasons for the changes made during the legislative process.' 5 3
One may, however, surmise the legislative intent in regard to each
of the above changes.
1. Quorum. In regard to the quorum requirement, the sub-
committee members may not have done any more than recognize
reality. That reality was that the actual size of the court, the man-
dated thirteen notwithstanding, was the choice of the convening
authority and his personal perception of what might consititute an
injury to the service. (Testimony before the subcommittee had
been that the average size of a general court-martial was nine.) 54
A further recognition of reality was that even if a thirteen member
court was convened, there was no requirement that the court re-
main at thirteen. If, for whatever reason, a member was excused
prior to judgment, the court could continue, assuming a minimum
five person quorum existed, with a lesser number, or substitute
members could be appointed. If the latter circumstance occurred,
as new members might be added, the testimony to the time of the
substitution would be re-read. Two deleterious results would,
therefore, occur. Delay and tedium could set in, and possibly a
court could consist of a substantial number of members who had
not percipiently heard key evidence and were, therefore, without
the opportunity to decide cases by judging the demeanor of
witnesses.
2. Verdict Rule. The decision to change the decisionmaking
rule from a majority to two-thirds was probably a compromise.
General Ansell had suggested a three-fourths rule for noncapital
offenses. 55 The recommendations at the hearing as to an appro-
priate fraction ranged from maintaining the existing majority rule
to as high as a four-fifths rule.' 56 A two-thirds rule was the me-
dian between the theretofore majority and the proposed three-
152. Id. at ch. II, art. 8.
153. In published remarks at the time S. 64 was offered as an amendment to S.
3792, Senator Chamberlain referred to a "report" of the subcommittee which was
adopted by the full committee. Inquiries to the Library of Congress and National
Archives disclosed no published form of any such report. Letter to Howard C. Co-
hen, from Assistant Chief, Law Library, American-British Law Division, The Library
of Congress (January 13, 1983); letter to Howard C. Cohen, from Legislative and
Diplomatic Branch, Civil Archives Division, National Archives & Records Service
(February 2, 1983) (letters on file in the offices of California Western Law Review).
154. Hearings, 1919, supra note 141, at 589 (statement of Gen. Bethel).
155. Id. at art. 46.
156. Id. at 592 (statement of Sen. Warren).
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fourths. 157
3. Member Qua(flcafion. Prior to 1920, there had been no
statutorily required criteria for selection of members for courts-
martial. General Ansell's proposed legislation likewise contained
no specific qualifications for members, save fairness, impartiality,
and competence.15 8 In all probability, the lack of specific require-
ments existed in his draft because the members were not to serve
as judges. Rather, a judge advocate general or, when not avail-
able, a qualified officer with legal learning and experience was to
serve in a judicial manner ruling upon all questions of law. 159
Though General Ansell did not delineate qualifications for
members, his proposed legislation did employ criteria for sum-
mary court-martial officers in virtually the same language as was
eventually adopted for members. 60 Since the testimony before
the subcommittee was that the state of military legal knowledge
and education in the officer corps was deplorable, 6 1 it is not sur-
prising for Congress to have adopted General Ansell's language
for court-martial members who were to continue to serve in a
quasi-judicial role. In other words, when Congress did not accept
General Ansell's suggestion to make the presiding judge advocate
general the sole judicial functionary, but continued the collective
judicial function of the entire court-martial, Congress imposed
what is now Article 25 criteria for members. 62 This was not for
their role as triers of fact, but as judges of law.' 63 The qualifica-
157. For example, a simple majority in a twelve person court would be seven to
five, a three-fourths vote would be nine to three, and two-thirds, eight to four. Like-
wise, a two-thirds vote for courts-martial numbering seven, nine, ten, and eleven
members, falls between majority and three-fourths requirements. For five and eight
person courts, a two-thirds vote requires the same as a three-fourths vote, whereas for
a six member court, a majority and two-thirds are identical. Also, a board of senior
officers called upon by the Secretary of War reported to the subcommittee its recom-
mendation as to the two-thirds rule. .d. at 442.
158. Id. at art. 10.
159. Id. at art. 12.
160. Id. at art. 7.
161. Id. at 40, 152.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., id. at 31, 539-40. Today, very few persons, if any, would question
the competence of staff corps officers in contrast to combat or line officers to sit as
members. Such mentality was not always the case:
As before stated, only commissioned officers can sit on courts-martial, and
two of our military writers have interpreted the word "commissioned" so as
to exclude officers of the Medical and Paymaster's Corps. The reasons as-
signed are those given by Attorney-General Berrien: He says, "If we look to
the origin of courts-martial in England (from whence we borrow them) it
would be difficult to believe that a tribunal which has succeeded there in the
ancient court of chivalry, could be composed of other than military men.
And if we consider the nature of the subjects which are generally submitted
to the decision of these tribunals, the knowledge of military discipline and
27
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tions were not enacted to ensure that a court-martial would be
consituted by a "blue-ribbon" panel of triers of fact, as apparently
perceived by the military courts of review in their recent deci-
sions, 164 but to enable the members to serve their judicial function
adequately.
4. Law Members. On its face, the amendment of military law
by which a law member was now to be selected especially as a
member of a general court-martial may appear to be the change
least apposite to the discussion. It is, however, the most
important.
Under most circumstances, it was envisioned that the detailed
law member would be a member of the Judge Advocate General's
Department. If, however, an officer of that department was not
available, an officer of another department "specially qualified"
to perform the duty could be asssigned as the law member. 65 The
special qualification was necessary because the law member was
to rule initially upon all interlocutory questions other than
challenges. 166
His ruling, however, was not absolute. If any member took ex-
ception to the ruling of the law member, the entire court would go
usage, and frequently of tactics (which is indispensable to those who preside
there), it would seem that non-combatants whose duties do not lead them to
acquire this species of information, and who have no rank, either real or
assimilated, could not be deemed competent to sit on court-martial."
The Judge-Advocate General, however, in referring to this subject, stated
that, "though it is in accordance with the general usage of the service not to
detail officrs of the medical corps of the army on courts-martial, where it
can be avoided, yet such details are not unfrequently and properly made at
stations where commissioned officers are few in number.
"Medical officers being, as a class, men of learning and a high order of
capacitiy and intelligence, no instance is known of any injurious result ensu-
ing from their being appointed on military courts. The proceedings of no
trial, where an officer of this corps was a member of the court, have, it is
believed, been for that reason disapproved, during the war; and a very con-
siderable number of records of military trials have been passed by this Bu-
reau as regular and sufficient, from which it appeared that such officer or
officers had been part of the detail."
Paymasters are not so frequently detailed upon courts-martial as medical
officers, but there seems no good reason, in our service, why they should not
be, as many of them have acquired a knowledge of military law in the line of
the army. Court-martial are called upon to act as judges and jurymen. As
jurymen it is hardly necessary to compare the ability of these two classes of
officers with that of the average juryman in criminal cases before the civil
courts; as judges their competency is certainly equal to that of officers when
first appointed from civil life, and who are frequently detailed for court-
martial service the moment they are appointed.
R. IvEs, A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAW 26-38 (1879) (footnotes omitted).
164. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
165. Act of 1920, supra note 145, ch. II, art. 8.
166. Id. at ch. II, art. 31.
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into closed session and the issue would be decided by a majority
vote. 167 One may conclude, therefore, that for a member of a
court-martial to engage in the function of objecting to a ruling of a
law member and/or voting upon such an objection in closed ses-
sion, and for this collective ruling function to be meaningful, all
the members would perforce need the education and knowledge
of military law that length of service, training, and experience
may have afforded each of them. 68 Therefore, although Con-
gress had not accepted General Ansell's suggestion to appoint a
non-member judge advocate general with power to rule upon the
law, it had taken the first step of a half-century long evolution to
that same end.
The Articles of War of 1920 sufficed until post-World War II.
Just as actual war experience had demonstrated weaknesses in the
pre-World War I Articles of War, similary the nation's experience
with a war of greater extent and long duration led to the belief
that further reform was necessary. As important, if not more so,
the unification of the major defense forces in the new Department
of Defense led to an enactment "[t]o unify, consolidate, revise and
codify the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of the
Navy, and the disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard, and to enact
and establish a Uniform Code of Military Justice."' 169
Under the U.C.M.J., the five person quorum, the typical two-
thirds rule, and the criteria for court-martial membership re-
mained intact. 170 The function of the law officer continued to
evolve, however.
First and foremost, the officer was now characterized as the law
officer rather than the law member.17 ' This was no mere semantic
167. Id. If a law member was not detailed, every interlocutory ruling was subject
to objection. If a law member was detailed, a member could object to any interlocu-
tory ruling except as to "the admissibility of evidence." That exception was, however,
subject to a further proviso that "objection to the admissibility of evidence. .. " did
not include a plethora of issues to which any member could still object. Id.
168. It may also be parenthetically noted that the qualification criteria for court-
martial membership was equally applicable to special courts-martial. No law mem-
ber was required to be assigned to a special court-martial. Rather, the initial ruling
on any interlocutory question was made by the president, ie., senior member of the
court, subject in all incidents, including questions as to the admissibility of evidence,
to the objection of any member, and upon such objection, the majority vote of the
entire court.
169. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107, amended by Act of Oct. 24, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 632, 82 Stat. 1335 [hereinafter cited as Act of 1950]. See Appendix B.
170. Id. at arts. 16(1), 52(2), 25(d)(2). The Articles of War, 1920, were the founda-
tion for the U.C.M.J. The Articles of the Government of the Navy which had contin-
ued to provide for a majority verdict were rejected in favor of the Army's two-third
rule. See S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV., 2222, 2248.
171. Act of 1950, supra note 169, at arts. 1(12), 26(a). Additionally, a law officer
was now required in naval general courts-martial, when previously, no law member
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change. The law officer could not generally communicate with
the members of the court except in open court in the presence of
the accused and both counsel, nor could he vote with the
members. 172
Second, while the 1920 Articles contained no mandatory quali-
fications for the law member, the U.C.M.J. required the law of-
ficer to be a member of a bar properly certified as qualified by the
Secretary of his/her respective service. 173
Third, and crucially, the ruling of a law officer on any interloc-
utory question except upon challenges for a finding of not guilty
or the question of the accused's sanity, was final and conclu-
sive.174 As with pre-U.C.M.J. Articles of War, though, no law of-
ficer was required to be assigned to a special court-martial and the
ruling of the president of a special court-martial upon any inter-
locutory question was subject to objection and vote. 175 Thus,
while the special qualifictions for court-martial membership,
which had originated for the member's judicial functions, contin-
ued to have a certain validity in the more numerous but less seri-
ous special courts-martial, the evolution of the functions of the
law officer moved more and more toward the role of a trial judge
and decreased the need for specialized knowledge amongst gen-
eral court-martial members per se.
The U.C.M.J. remained relatively unchanged for nearly two de-
cades. In 1968, the evolution of the institution of the court-mar-
tial continued by the passage of an act the preamble of which
clearly states the legislative intent, namely "[tlo increase the par-
ticipation of military judges and counsel on courts-martial
"176
First, the change served to amend the title of the law officer to
"military judge." 77 Second, a military judge could now be de-
was ever required. S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV., 2222, 2227.
172. Act of 1950, supra note 169, at art. 26(b).
173. Id. at art 26(a).
174. Id. at art. 51(b).
175. Id.
176. Pub. Law 90-362, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968). When the Act of 1920 was enacted,
the purpose was "to radically change the philosophy... of the system of administra-
tion of military justice." Hearings, 1919, supra note 141, at 374. The passage of the
U.C.M.J. in 1950 was indeed a fundamental change. It not only effected the contin-
ued evolution of the law officer but also the potential participation of enlisted person-
nel, Act of 1950, supra note 169, at art. 25(c)(1), as well as the elimination of the
Articles of Government of the Navy, see supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text.
Likewise, the Act of 1968 was a "dramatic change" from the original 1950 U.C.M.J.
and practice under the former is like "night and day" compared to the latter. Re-
marks of Chief Judge Robinson Everett, Court of Military Appeals, to West Coast
Navy/Marine Corps Judge Advocate General conference, February 19, 1983.
177. 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1982).
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tailed to a special court-martial, which has become common prac-
tice. 178 Third, the accused may request, in noncapital cases, a trial
by a military judge sitting alone. 179 Fourth, except in the very
rare circumstance of a court-martial convened by the President or
the Secretary of a service, no convening authority or member of
his staff may prepare or review any report concerning the effec-
tiveness, fitness or efficiency of a military judge.180 And fifth, the
rulings of the military judge on all interlocutory and law ques-
tions, except the mental responsibility of the accused, are final and
conclusive. 8 1 Similarly, the judicial power of the president of a
special court-martial, sitting without a military judge, was sijb-
stantially increased vis-a-vis the general membership. Except on
challenges and upon a motion for a finding of not guilty, his/her
rulings are final and conclusive. 8 2
After little or no change in military judicial procedures over
centuries, the American military judicial system, spurred on by
apparent abuses of process during the world wars, has evolved
comparatively rapidly in the past half-century to where the mem-
bers of a court-martial, for all intents and purposes, function in
similar mode to their civilian counterpart, the jury. Under such
circumstances, the existing two-thirds qubtient for guilt can no
longer remain a constitutionally valid rule. The time is ripe for
the military appellate courts to examine the true evolution of the
function of the members and determine that the great similarities
between juries and courts-martial outweigh the insignificant dif-
ferences, so as to require the same verdict rule.
CONCLUSION
When the evolutionary changes of the courts-martial are viewed
with retrospection, it becomes clear that the role of the law mem-
ber, and then the law officer, and currently the military judge, has
increasingly ascended. The role of the members, however, has
eroded from quasi-judges to virtually no judicial role at all.
Hence, the historical reason for utilizing first a majority vote and
currently a two-thirds vote for guilt, namely the members' role as
judges or quasi-judges, is no longer valid. Similarly, the U.C.M.J.
Article 25 criteria, drafted with the judicial function in mind,
178. 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(2)(B), 826 (1982). In general practice, a military judge is
assigned to a special court-martial, for the special court-martial without a militaryjudge is without jurisdiction to adjudge a bad conduct discharge (except in the case of
adverse physical condition or military exigencies). Id. at § 819.
179. Id. at § 816 (1)(B), (2)(C).
180. Id. § 826(c).
181. Id. at § 851(b).
182. Id.
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should have little import, if any, on the proper quotient of votes
necessary to convict. In reality, once it is perceived that the role of
the members of a court-martial differs in no remarkable degree,
either in function or performance from a civil jury, then the same
constitutional standard for a proper verdict rule should apply.
This is not to say that a court-martial is exactly the same as a
civilian jury, nor that all of the rights that a civilian defendant has
under the sixth amendment are applicable. For example, given
rank structure and demographic limitations, a military accused
cannot have the luxury of a randomly chosen court-martial nor
necessarily constituted of persons of the vicinity wherein an al-
leged crime was committed.
What it does mean, however, is that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard required by due process will be thwarted unless a substantial
majority of a court-martial vote for guilt. Given the short-com-
ings of any small group as a deliberative body, a substantial ma-
jority-to give reasonable doubt a significant meaning-would
require unanimity of courts-martial comprised of as few as six, or
even seven, members. 8 3 Due process, when examined historically
and analytically, requires no less.'84
183. Very recently, in Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (1983) the United
States Supreme Court held that military personnel "may not maintain a suit to re-
cover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations." d. at
2368 (footnote omitted). In the course of the opinion, Chief Justice Burger wrote that:
"The special status of the military has required, the Constitution contemplated, Con-
gress has created and this Court has long recognized two systems of justice, to some
extent parallel: one for civilians and one for military personnel". Id. at 2367 (citation
omitted). This sentence should not be read out of context. The omitted citation was
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953), the very same case which the military
courts cite to establish that the Bill of Rights are applicable to military personnel. See
supra note 84 and accompanying text. n addition, the Chief Justice expressly stated
that: "This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are
barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the
course of military service." Id at 2367 (citations omitted). Nothing contained within
Chappell could be said to denigrate against the concept that the reasonable standard,
required in both the civilian and military context, should be qualitatively different.
184. In Chappell, the Court recognized that:
The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the
consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of mili-
tary justice, is too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military organ-
ization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be
unacceptable in a civilian setting.
Id. at 2365 (citations omitted).
One may ponder whether the retention within the military of an accused who
would be acquitted by a five to one or six to three vote for guilt, would be a problem
for military discipline or preparedness. At least two rejoinders may be made to that
rhetorical question. First, under the current verdict rules, acquittals in which a ma-
jority vote for guilt, e.g., five to three or six to four are tolerated. Second, and more
important, that rhetorical question confuses retention with conviction. A civilian de-
fendant who is acquitted of a battery charge may be successfully sued by a plaintiff-
victim, notwithstanding the criminal acquittal. Similarly, there is no apparent consti-
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APPENDIX A
The author sent a survey concerning the asking of questions by
courts-martial members to thirty-seven naval general and special
court-martial judges. Of the thirty-seven, thirty-three responded.
The overwhelming majority (88%) stated that they always ad-
vised members of their privilege to ask questions although of these
one volunteered that his advice was aimed at deterring questions
and another stated that he admonishes the members of the role of
counsel. Another two judges (6%) responded that they usually or
almost always advise the members of their privilege, while two
responded that they never advise the members concerning
questioning.
One of the inquiries to the judges concerned the frequency
within which members do ask questions. Nine (27%) answered
that the frequency was one-third of the time or less, four (12%)
opined that it was about half the time, and the remainder (61%)
felt that the frequency exceeded two-thirds the total.
In regard to the quantity of questions posed, more than half
(19) thought the amount of questions asked were neither extensive
nor insignificant. Of the remainder, however, far more believed
the quantity to be insignificant (38%) than extensive (5%).
In addition to the quantitative data, many of the judges offered
narrative comments. While lengthy, a selected summary of cer-
tain observations is instructive. Some of the judges had positive
comments, e.g., "generally, the questions posed by members are
helpful and work to clarify issues. . . ," "questions are generally
good to excellent," "members typically ask questions relating to
military details which reflect knowledge of shipboard routine and
Navy life," "it is remarkable how many times a member will dis-
cover a significant line of questioning overlooked (for whatever
reason) by counsel," and "most often, [questions] are highly rele-
vant and fill in voids. . . . I would not want to take this right
from them."
In contrast to the foregoing, however, the majority of comments
were to the contrary: "most [questioning is] insignificant or irrele-
vant [and] impacts unfairly on accused, because members do not
really appreciate the government's burden," "[questioning] does
not usually elicit information of great value . . . but does tele-
graph [the members'] thinking. . . ," "It's hairy . . . some unu-
sual [questions, for example]. . .Is there a pre-trial agreement in
this case? If so, what are the terms?," "the most significant prob-
tutional provision to prevent an armed service from terminating an individual's serv-
ice on a burden of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
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lem is the time consuming practical procedure. . . with the possi-
ble resultant need to clear the courtroom of members to litigate
the propriety of the posed question, .... members seem to have dif-
ficulty with relevant questions; (examples given), these are ques-
tions of senior officers! . . . this is a 'dangerous' area; when one
member asks a question, they all want to; when you discourage
the number of questions, they seem dismayed; however, if you ad-
vise that a question is 'not relevant,' they will back off and not ask
any questions" (emphasis in original), ". . . I do not like a court
member to become an examiner--do not allow it," "about 40-50%
of members' questions are not allowed by reason of irrelevance.
On sentencing, a substantial number of members inquire about
misconduct not charged. I am continually challenged to find im-
aginative ways to disallow members' questions without alienating
the members. . . ," "it is not uncommon for me to be baffled as
to the relevance. . . of the questions," "I consider the practice of
allowing members to question witnesses a dangerous one [that] we
would do well to eliminate."
The most exhaustive and insightful commentary is quoted in
greater detail:
In the overwhelming majority of instances, the questions are
either cumulative or irrelevant, or, at best, concern trivialities
that are inconsequential to the central issue of the case....
[serving] only to prolong the trial needlessly .... [Q]uestions
during the presentation of the cases on the merits [are] virtually
worthless. However, during the sentencing portion of the trial,
the questions tend to be more insightful. When a witness testi-
fies, for example, about an accused's worth to this command,
members generally ask very perceptive questions about the ac-
cused's specific duties and how they relate to the commands
overall mission .... The only unfortunate aspect of this
sharp contrast between findings and sentencing is that ...
members tend to ask relatively few questions during
sentencing.
I would applaud the abolition of members' questions during
the case on the merits .... However, as long as courts-mar-
tial retain sentencing by members, I favor retaining members'
questions [which] would be consistent with the contemporary
philosophy of providing the sentencing authority with as much
information as possible about the accused.
(The survey is on file in the offices of California Western Law
Review).
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APPENDIX B
During the printing of this article, on December 6, 1983, Presi-
dent Reagan signed S. 974 into law as the Military Justice Act of
1983, Pub. L. 98-209. In addition to establishing a commission to
study further military law revisions and make recommendations
to Congress, the act amends 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-02, 806, 815-16, 825-
27, 829, 834, 838, 847, 849, 854, 857, 860-67, 869-871, 876, 936,
1552-53 and 28 U.S.C. § 2101 and adds 10 U.S.C. § 912a and 28
U.S.C. § 1259.
Certain primary changes relate to the appellate process. First,
review of decisions of the Court of Military Appeals directly by
the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari is authorized. Second,
except in death cases, the accused may waive review or withdraw
his appeal from consideration by the Court of Military Review or,
as appropriate, the applicable Judge Advocate General. Third,
the United States may appeal certain orders or rulings by a mili-
tary judge to the Court of Military Review.
Other changes include, inter alia: (1) specific pretrial recom-
mendations must be made to a general court-martial convening
authority by his staff judge advocate, (2) significant changes have
been made concerning the initial post-trial action and review by a
convening authority, and (3) a punitive article concerning con-
trolled substances has been added.
Most of the provisions of the act become effective August 1,
1984.
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